This work is aimed at analyzing the 1973 oil embargo, its attendant effect on the western developed nations, the events after the embargo especially in relation to the continued existence of a politics of scarcity and why specifically has such politics not been witnessed again after the 1973 successful attempt. The work will therefore critically access if OPEC has had its power reduced between 1973 and now and if such is responsible for the absence of the politics of scarcity.
The work will equally find out if internal wrangling within OPEC had made impossible the events of the 973 oil embargo repeating itself or if certain strategies of OPEC are deficient and have therefore served as a big obstacle at exploring a politics of scarcity towards a more powerful OPEC. The work employs an interpretative method of analyzing its data by critically accessing the very many factors that may be responsible for an absence of a politics of scarcity as was experienced in 1973.
This it does by critically analyzing the very important role that profitability and viewing oil as an income rather than as a weapon may have had on the politics of oil and in strengthening OPEC’s position in international politics. A linkage and relationship are therefore built by the work between OPEC’s specifically the internal and external factors to OPEC and its incapacity at a continued exploration of the politics of scarcity.
The work finds out that the politics of scarcity has continued to be absent in the politics of oil principally due to factors internal to OPEC which have adversely affected the power of the organization in the global community. It concludes that until certain moves are made beyond OPEC as it presently exists the organization may no longer be as efficient and ffective as it was in the 1973 oil embargo days. This might necessitate dramatically re-strategizing OPEC as it presently stands in a way to change its focus from only an income generating organization.